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Argued 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The separate litigations ensuing from certain railroads' 
participation in an antitrust conspiracy and thefinancial 
demise of the Penn Central Transportation Company now 
span three decades. See In the Matter of Penn Central 
Transportation Company, 458 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 
1978); In Re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation, 
759 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Pa. 1991). Our decision today 
unfortunately perpetuates this longevity as we resolve only 
the issue of which jurisdiction adjudicates the issue of "who 
ultimately pays." 
 
USX Corporation (USX) and Bessemer and Lake Erie 
Railroad (B&LE) filed state and federal actions against 
American Premier Underwriters, Inc. (American Premier), 
the reorganized successor of Penn Central, seeking 
indemnity and contribution of the approximately $600 
million USX paid in satisfaction of judgments against B&LE 
in ten antitrust actions. American Premier urged that the 
actions be dismissed based upon provisions of the Final 
Consent Decree entered in the Penn Central bankruptcy 
matter. The parties agreed to stay the indemnity and 
contribution proceedings pending a decision by the judge 
presiding over the bankruptcy matters as to the present 
action's viability in light of the Consent Decree. 
 
Eventually, USX filed a notice of dismissal of the federal 
contribution and indemnity suit pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1). The district court, by adoption of a magistrate 
judge's report and recommendation, approved the 
dismissal. American Premier strongly disputes the propriety 
of the voluntary dismissal at the particular point of 
litigation in which it was granted. In its view, a summary 
judgment motion submitted by it prior to the filing of the 
notice of dismissal precluded a voluntary dismissal of the 
federal suit. 
 
We will affirm the order of the district court. The specific 
chronology of the proceedings, the language of the relevant 
 




orders, and the conduct of the parties necessitate a 
conclusion that at the time the voluntary notice of 
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) was filed, the status of the 
case was such that the notice was appropriate and the 






Prior to 1989, B&LE was a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
USX. Pursuant to an indemnity agreement, USX paid 
nearly $600 million in satisfaction of antitrust judgments 
entered against B&LE in In Re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore 
Antitrust Litigation, 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
The basis for the claims in the antitrust litigation was 
that conspiring railroads, including B&LE, acted to restrain 
trade in the movement of iron ore by ship across the Great 
Lakes to docks on the south shore of Lake Erie. Iron ore 
was traditionally transported in mud-like form in vessels 
which had to be unloaded using special cranes available 
only at railroad-owned docks. Some producers then began 
shipping iron ore in pellet form which permitted the ore to 
travel in self-unloading vessels. The ore could then be 
unloaded at private docks. This method of shipment did not 
require either the railroads' equipment or the railroads 
themselves -- trucks could now be used to carry the iron 
ore inland. 
 
The railroads conspired to preserve their monopoly 
position in transporting iron ore by preventing the 
development of this alternative transportation system for 
the iron ore. The conspiracy succeeded in delaying 
establishment of the self-unloading method and negatively 
impacted steel companies, private dock companies, 
trucking companies and a shipbuilder. 
 
In the 1980's, twelve cases were filed under the Sherman 
Act and the Ohio Valentine Act by the injured industries 
against Penn Central, B&LE and several other railroads. 
The damages claimed varied: the steel companies lost the 
cost savings of the self-unloading transportation system; 
 




the private dock companies were excluded from the iron ore 
unloading business; the trucking companies were 
foreclosed from carrying iron ore which could have been 
unloaded at the private docks; and the shipbuilder was 
denied the use of its vessels. 
 
Three separate actions were also brought by a private 
dock owner, a self-unloading shipbuilder and a trucking 
company in the Northern District of Ohio (the Northern 
District litigations). In the Northern District cases, the 
claims of two of the plaintiffs against Penn Central were 
dismissed in January 1986 on the ground that they were 
discharged in the Penn Central reorganization proceeding. 
The Ohio district court then dismissed B&LE's cross-and 
third-party claims against Penn Central for indemnification 
under both federal and Ohio law and for contribution under 
federal law to the extent these claims were asserted against 
Penn Central as to alleged post-consummation conduct. 
Pinney Dock and Transportation Co. v. Penn Central Corp., 
1982 W.L. 1914 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 1982). 
 
The remaining Northern District litigation and the actions 
brought by private dock owners, trucking companies and 
steel mills brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
were then consolidated. All the claims brought by the 
antitrust plaintiffs against Penn Central were dismissed. 
 
After trial, B&LE was held liable to the various plaintiffs 
under both the Sherman Act and the Ohio Valentine Act for 
amounts totaling over $600 million. B&LE settled with four 
of the plaintiffs during the appeal process and paid two 
other judgments after appeal. B&LE also settled the claims 
brought against it by the two remaining plaintiffs in the 
Northern District litigations. 
 
B. Present Action 
 
B&LE then sought indemnity from American Premier 
with respect to the amounts paid to the antitrust plaintiffs. 
On May 26, B&LE filed a complaint in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, claiming 
contribution from American Premier under Ohio law for its 
proportionate share of the antitrust damages. B&LE 
alternatively claimed entitlement to common law indemnity 
 




for that portion of the damages assessed which B&LE 
asserted were attributable to Penn Central. In order to 
preserve claims exclusively within federal jurisdiction, 
B&LE also filed on the same day an action against 
American Premier in the United States District Court in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania. 
 
On June 24, 1994, American Premier filed a petition 
before Judge Fullam of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who had presided over 
the Penn Central reorganization and bankruptcy, seeking 
preliminary injunctive relief as well as an order directing 
B&LE to dismiss its claims against Penn Central as barred 
under the Consummation Order and Final Decree in the 
reorganization proceedings. 
 
At a July 21, 1994, hearing on the petition, the parties 
orally entered into a stipulation spread on the record and 
recited by Judge Fullam: "[I]t is stipulated by counsel that 
... all proceedings will be stayed as to B&LE until I dispose 
of this petition. This will not preclude the plaintiffs in either 
of these actions from amending their pleading if they want 
to do so." 
 
The District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania was advised of the stipulation by a written 
notice of stipulation filed August 4, 1994. That notice of 
stipulation, drafted and filed by American Premier, was not 
executed by B&LE nor signed by the district court. 
 
On October 13, 1994, Judge Fullam decided the request 
for injunctive relief in Penn Central's favor and issued the 
following order: 
 
       [B&LE] and [USX] are restrained and enjoined from 
       asserting or prosecuting, or attempting to assert or 
       prosecute their claims in USX Corporation v. The Penn 
       Central Corporation No. 94-877 (W.D.Pa.), and USX 
       Corporation v. The Penn Central Corporation No. 94- 
       271/91 (C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio). 
 
On the basis of Judge Fullam's decision, the District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania issued an 
order on November 2, 1994, directing the Clerk to withdraw 
the present action from the list of active cases and mark 
the action "closed." 
 




B&LE moved for clarification and reconsideration of the 
November 2 order to insure that the district court had not 
dismissed the claims in its amended complaint so that it 
could pursue them if Judge Fullam's decision was reversed 
on appeal. B&LE also filed a precautionary notice of appeal 
with us from the November 2 order. 
 
By order of December 28, 1994, the district court 
clarified its November 2 order: 
 
       [I]t is hereby ordered that this court's order dated 
       November 2, 1994 shall not be considered a dismissal 
       or disposition of the above captioned action, and that, 
       should further proceedings in the action become 
       necessary or desirable, either party may initiate the 
       same in the same manner as if this order had not been 
       entered; provided however, that plaintiffs, USX 
       Corporation and Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad 
       Company, shall not prosecute or attempt to assert or 
       prosecute any claim in the above captioned action 
       during the pendency of the order dated October 13, 
       1994 entered by the United States District Court for 
       the Eastern District of Pennsylvania referred to in this 
       court's November 2, 1994 order. 
 
(Emphasis added.) Based on this clarifying language, B&LE 
withdrew its appeal to our court with respect to the 
November 2, 1994 order. 
 
On December 12, 1995, we reversed Judge Fullam's 
October 13, 1994 order, holding that the claims brought by 
B&LE in this case arose post-consummation and hence 
were not discharged in the Penn Central bankruptcy. See In 
Re Penn Central Transportation Company, 71 F.3d 1113 (3d 
Cir. 1995). A petition for rehearing was denied on February 
16, 1996. 
 
On March 22, 1996, a motion to stay the mandate was 
entered. The parties were advised, pursuant to practice in 
our court, that if a petition for certiorari was filed within 
the time that the stay was entered, the mandate would not 
issue until the Supreme Court proceedings were concluded. 
 
On May 28, 1996, the United States Supreme Court 
denied American Premier's petition for writ of certiorari. 




Penn Central Underwriters, Inc. v. USX Corporation , 116 
S.Ct. 1851 (1996). Our Clerk's office received notice of the 
denial on May 30, 1996, and our court's mandate was 
issued on June 3, 1996. On June 25, 1996, Judge Fullam 
entered an order denying American Premier's petition for 
dismissal in accordance with our mandate. 
 
Prior to Judge Fullam's action on the mandate but after 
the denial of certiorari, on May 30, 1996, American Premier 
filed a motion for summary judgment for dismissal of all 
the claims in the amended complaint in the Western 
District action. Eight days later, on June 7, 1996, B&LE 
filed a notice of dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1) or, alternatively, a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 41(a)(2). After being advised by court personnel that 
the case remained closed and that all recently filed motions 
should be withdrawn, on June 12, 1996, B&LE filed a 
motion to reopen the case for purposes of filing a notice of 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1). American Premier 
opposed the motion to reopen. Then, after Judge Fullam 
acted on our mandate on June 25, 1996, B&LE againfiled 
a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1). 
 
A hearing on the summary judgment and dismissal 
motions was held before a magistrate judge. After briefing, 
the magistrate judge recommended that American Premier's 
motion for summary judgment be stricken and that B&LE's 
notice of dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 
41(a)(1) be upheld. The court reasoned that when American 
Premier's motion for summary judgment was filed, the 
Western District matter had been stayed by agreement of 
the parties. Because the stay was in effect when the motion 
for summary judgment was filed, that motion was a nullity. 
The magistrate judge further concluded that the Rule 
41(a)(1) notice was the only motion properly before it and 
that a responsive pleading had not been filed. The 
magistrate judge therefore recommended that "the motion 
for summary judgment (Docket No. 14) be stricken, and 
that the motion to voluntarily dismiss the action without 
prejudice (Docket No. 25) be granted."1  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Docket No. 25 refers to B&LE's Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal rather 
than its alternative Rule 41(a)(2) motion for dismissal, which is recorded 
at Docket No. 17. 
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 On October 31, 1996, "after de novo review of the 
pleadings and documents in this case" the district court 
issued its order: 
 
       It is hereby ordered that defendant's motion for 
       summary judgment (Docket No. 14) is stricken, and 
       that plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal of this 
       action pursuant to 41(a)(1) (Docket No. 25) is granted. 
 
The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge 
was adopted as the opinion of the court. This appeal 





We must decide the point at which the stay of the 
Western District proceedings was dissolved. This 
determination enables us to identify which of the pleadings, 
if any, were appropriate for the court's consideration and, 
specifically, whether the Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal 
was filed timely.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
In its order, the district court repeated the contradictory language of 
the magistrate judge's order, that a motion for voluntary dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) was granted. 
 
2. We do not address American Premier's second issue, whether 
dismissal by the court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) was appropriate. 
While we realize that the language of the final order on appeal might 
indicate that the Rule 41(a)(2) motion was considered by the district 
court, examination of the docket and the proceedings convinces us that 
the Rule 41(a)(2) issue did not form the basis of the district court's 
decision. 
 
In its order, the district court granted what it referred to as the 
"motion" to dismiss the action rather than the notice of dismissal under 
Rule 41(a)(1). However, the district court parenthetically referred to the 
"motion" as Docket No. 25 which is actually the June 25 "notice" of 
dismissal. Since the Docket No. 25 notice of dismissal was the only 
viable document before the court, it is apparent that the district court 
was granting the plaintiff's notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) and 
not its alternative motion under 41(a)(2). 
 




We thus direct our attention to the terms of the 
stipulation which stayed these proceedings. 
 
A consensual stipulation of the parties is "to be 
interpreted according to the general principles of contract 
construction." Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad Co., 824 F.2d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
With these principles in mind, we must preliminarily 
determine whether the stipulation is ambiguous as a 
matter of law. Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 1995). A contract is 
ambiguous if, after hearing evidence presented by the 
parties, the court determines that objective indicia exists to 
support the view that "the terms of the contract are 
susceptible of different meanings." Teamsters Indus. 
Employees Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 
989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993). If the terms are then 
considered to be ambiguous, the factfinder must interpret 
the terms. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 
619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 1980); Matter of Nelson Co., 
959 F.2d 1260, 1263 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the language 
utilized by Judge Fullam, in placing on the record the 
stipulation to stay, is subject to interpretation. Thus, we 
review the district court's findings concerning the meaning 




Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
       [A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without 
       order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any 
       time before service by the adverse party of an answer 
       or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first 
       occurs 
 
       . . . . 
 
The essential issue, thus, is whether at the time Penn 
Central filed its motion for summary judgment the stay 
issued by Judge Fullam was still in effect. If the stay was 
in effect, the summary judgment motion was a nullity 
 




which allowed B&LE to file a notice of dismissal under Rule 
41(a)(1). 
 
In deciding if the Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal should 
be granted, the district court concluded that the stay 
agreed to by the parties was not lifted until June 25, 1996, 
when Judge Fullam acted on our mandate and denied 
American Premier's petition seeking an order of dismissal of 
the action brought by B&LE. Persuading the district court 
was the conduct of American Premier itself: 
 
       Had American Premier believed that the stay was in 
       effect only until Judge Fullam entered an order, the 
       motion for summary judgment would have been filed at 
       some point shortly after Judge Fullam entered his 
       order in October 1994. Instead, Penn Central waited 
       until the Third Circuit reversed Judge Fullam's order 
       and the petition for certiorari was denied. 
 
Our review of the chronology of the case3 and of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In summary fashion the relevant timeline is as follows: 
 
5/26/94    - Complaint filed in Western District; 
           - Amended 8/5/94 
 
6/24/94    - Petition before Judge Fullam filed in Eastern District 
           seeking to enjoin Western District action. 
 
7/21/94    - Judge Fullam spreads stipulation on record: "all 
           proceedings stayed as to B&LE until I dispose of 
           petition." 
 
10/13/94   - Judge Fullam decides: "B&LE restrained from 
           prosecuting western district action." 
 
11/2/94    - Western District Clerk marks action"closed." 
 
12/28/94   - Western District issues clarifying order: closure of case 
           not a dismissal, but B&LE cannot prosecute action 
           "during pendency of order dated 10/13/94." 
 
12/12/95   - We reverse Judge Fullam; Matter of Penn Central 
           Transp. Co., 71 F.3d 1113 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
3/22/96    - Motion to stay mandate during Supreme Court 
           proceedings. 
 
5/28/96    - Supreme Court denies certiorari. 
 
5/30/96    - American Premier motion for summary judgment in 
           Western District action. 
 
6/3/96     - We issue mandate. 
 
6/7/96     - B&LE files notice of dismissal 41(a)(1) and, alternatively, 
           motion for dismissal 41(a)(2). 
 




interpretation of the language of the court's orders 
convinces us that the district court was correct. Certainly, 
until October 13, 1994, when Judge Fullam granted 
American Premier's petition to enjoin the Western District 
action, the stay remained in effect. In finding in favor of 
Penn Central, Judge Fullam ordered: "B&LE and USX are 
restrained and enjoined from asserting or prosecuting their 
claims in the Western District action." 
 
We conclude that this order, by its terms, extended the 
stay. Although American Premier argues that the order only 
restrained B&LE, and not it, from continuing in the 
Western District action, we are not persuaded. If read as 
permitting American Premier to continue litigating the 
action, B&LE would have been precluded from responding. 
This could not have been the intent of Judge Fullam nor is 
it consistent with the general conduct of litigation. 
 
The activity in the Western District also militates against 
a finding that the stay was dissolved. On November 2, 
1994, based on Judge Fullam's order, the district court 
ordered the Clerk to withdraw the action from the list of 
active cases and mark the action "closed." At this point, 
further pleadings could not be filed. The court later 
clarified, on December 28, 1994, that marking the case 
closed was not tantamount to a dismissal of the case; its 
intent was to implement Judge Fullam's order that B&LE 
shall not prosecute any claim in the action during the 
pendency of the order dated October 13, 1994. 
 
We must now determine at which point the Eastern 
District matter became final, allowing once again for the 
filing of pleadings in the Western District action. As noted, 
on May 28, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Two days 
later, American Premier filed its motion for summary 
judgment. On June 7, B&LE filed its 41(a)(1) notice of 
dismissal and an alternative motion for dismissal under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6/12/96   - After parties advised by Western District that case 
          remained closed, B&LE files motion to reopen tofile 
          41(a)(1) notice of dismissal. American Premier opposes. 
 
6/25/96   - Judge Fullam acts on mandate. B&LEfiles another 
          41(a)(1) notice (Docket #25). 
 




Rule 41(a)(2). At this point, the parties were informed by 
the Clerk of the Western District that the case had 
remained closed and the recent filings had not been 
accepted. B&LE, on June 12, responded by requesting a 
motion to reopen and for 41(a)(1) dismissal. The motion was 
opposed by Penn Central. 
 
On June 25, 1996, Judge Fullam acted on the mandate 
from our court based upon the remand from the Supreme 
Court. The stay to which the parties had stipulated 
continued through the entire appellate process and 
terminated only when Judge Fullam acted on the mandate 
of our court and denied American Premier's request to 
enjoin B&LE from proceeding in the Western District. Later 
that day, B&LE filed its notice of dismissal under Rule 
41(a)(1) in the Western District. This last notice of dismissal 
(Docket No. 25) was the only pleading filed after the 
Eastern District case was finally resolved, and therefore, it 
was the only motion viable in the Western District. Because 
this notice was filed "before service by the adverse party of 
an answer or of a motion for summary judgment" as 
required by Rule 41(a)(1), the district court did not err in its 
conclusion that the notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) 
was appropriate. Since no other pleadings were before it, it 
cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion 




We will, therefore, affirm the order of the district court. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       for the Third Circuit 
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